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Abstract
The remote user authentication scheme of Lin and Lai, that uses a smart card
and a fingerprint measurement, is reviewed and shown to possess significant
security issues.
1 Introduction
Lin and Lai [3] propose a method for remote user authentication to a server
using a combination of a password, a biometric, a smart card, and a protocol
derived from the El Gamal signature scheme [1]. The protocol is a modified
version of a similar scheme due to Lee, Ryu and Yoo [2].
Lin and Lai claim in [3] that the scheme is secure. However, no rigorous
evidence of security is provided. We show in this paper that, in fact, the
scheme has significant weaknesses that cast doubt on its useability.
2 The user authentication scheme
We first briefly review the operation of the scheme. The scheme has two main
phases — user registration, and operational use of the scheme for user au-
thentication (login). There is also a means defined to change a user password.
All three of these phases are outlined below.
The scheme described in [3] is based on a specific biometric, namely fin-
gerprint recognition. The smart card given to each user as a result of regis-
tration is equipped with a ‘template’ for the user fingerprint. However it is
not clear whether or not this card is assumed to possess a fingerprint reader.
In the descriptions below we use h to denote a cryptographic hash-
function (that inputs a string of bits of arbitrary length and outputs a fixed
length string of bits), and ⊕ to denote the bit-wise exclusive-or operation on
strings of bits (where, if the two bit strings are of unequal length, the shorter
one is padded with zeros).
Prior to any user registrations, the server (to which the users will authen-
ticate) must choose certain system parameters. In particular a prime P must
be chosen and a secret exponent x must be chosen and held securely.
2.1 Registration
We suppose user A, with identifier iA, is to be registered. It is stated that
user identifiers must have a fixed format, although the nature of this format
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(and the ‘quantity’ of redundancy in this format) is not specified. It is also
assumed that iA can be treated as an integer.
Registration involves the following steps.
1. User A has his/her biometric template computed — for fingerprint
recognition this will contain a specification of the fingerprint minutiae,
denoted by sA. For the purposes of the scheme we assume that this is
a string of bits.
2. User A chooses a password, pA. For the purposes of the scheme we
assume that this consists of a string of bits.
3. The registration centre operated by the authentication server computes
yA = ((iA)
x mod p)⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA)
where the integer (iA)
x mod p is converted to a string of bits by some
means (e.g. by taking the binary representation).
4. The registration centre stores iA, sA and yA, together with the system
parameter P , on a smart card, which is issued to user A. The smart
card is assumed to be equipped with an implementation of the hash-
function h.
2.2 Login
When user A is to be authenticated, the following steps are performed.
1. The user inserts the issued smart card into a card reader (remote to
the authentication server) and also provides a fingerprint imprint. As
mentioned above, it is not stated in [3] whether it is assumed that the
fingerprint reader is integral to the smart card (e.g. as in [6, 7]), or
built into the card reader. However, this makes a significant difference
to the overall security of the scheme, as we discuss below. The user is
further required to input a password. The entered password (p∗A) and
the fingerprint data (if gathered externally to the card) are passed to
the card.
2. The card compares the captured fingerprint data with the stored bio-
metric template sA. If they do not match then processing is aborted.
3. The card generates a random integer r using the captured fingerprint
data.
2
4. The card computes
C1 = (iA)
r mod P
and
C2 = (yA ⊕ h(p∗A ⊕ sA))r.(h(yA ⊕ T ⊕ h(p∗A ⊕ sA))) mod P
where T is a newly generated timestamp, the integer yA is converted
to a string of bits, and where the strings of bits yA ⊕ h(p∗A ⊕ sA) and
h(yA ⊕ T ⊕ h(p∗A ⊕ sA)) are converted to integers.
5. The card sends C = (iA, C1, C2, T ) to the authentication server.
6. The authentication server checks the format of iA for correctness (by
some unspecified means).
7. The authentication server checks that the timestamp T is within the
current ‘acceptance window’.
8. The authentication server computes
C2(C1)
−x mod P
and
h(((iA)
x mod P )⊕ T ) mod P
and accepts A only if the two agree (where −x is computed modulo
P − 1).
2.3 Password change
When user A wishes to change his/her password pA, the following steps are
performed.
1. The user inserts the issued smart card into a card reader (remote to
the authentication server) and also provides a fingerprint imprint.
2. The user inputs both the existing password pA and the new password
p∗A.
3. The card computes
y∗A = yA ⊕ (h(pA ⊕ sA) mod P )⊕ (h(p∗A ⊕ sA) mod P ).
4. The card replaces yA with y
∗
A.
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3 Analysis
We now describe a number of security issues with the Lin-Lai scheme. Some
of these issues arise because of the lack of clarity in the description of the
scheme, although others apply regardless of how the description is inter-
preted.
First observe that Lin and Lai [3] do not provide a threat model for
their scheme, and hence it is not possible to be certain about what types of
threat their scheme is designed to address. However, given that the scheme
is designed as a remote user authentication scheme, we assume that the card
reader (and attached device, e.g. a PC) into which the user card is inserted,
are not necessarily trusted. As a result we consider the case below where
a malicious third party has obtained a password for a stolen card, e.g. by
persuading the legitimate user to perform an authentication process using
a fraudulent or manipulated card reader. This corresponds to a claim in
Section 1 of [3], where it is stated that the scheme is designed to withstand
attacks where the password and card have been stolen.
It is also not stated in [3] where the timestamp T is derived from. We
therefore assume that this is generated externally to the card, i.e. by the
card reader or attached terminal, since smart cards are typically not able to
maintain a clock. This is because such cards do not normally have a power
supply.
• Suppose a malicious party has stolen a card and also knows the pass-
word for this card. If the malicious party can also arrange for a valid
fingerprint sample to be provided to the card, then it is simple to see
that the card can be misused to impersonate the legitimate user. How
difficult providing a valid fingerprint sample to the card will be depends
on whether the fingerprint reader is integral to the card. If it is not,
then replaying a copied fingerprint sample to the card is trivially sim-
ple. If the reader is integral to the card then research of Matsumoto
et al. [4, 5] suggests that, given a copy of the fingerprint of the legit-
imate cardholder, e.g. as left on a glass, then a false ‘finger’ can be
manufactured from gelatine that will provide a valid reading. Thus,
regardless of the location of the fingerprint reader, the system would
appear vulnerable to loss of card and password, contrary to the claim
made in [3].
• Since the protocol only has a single message exchange (from card to
server), the authentication server relies entirely on the time stamp T
to determine the ‘liveness’ of the card. However, as we have mentioned
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above, the timestamp will not be generated by the card, and the card
cannot know whether or not a timestamp provided by a terminal is valid
or not. As a result a malicious terminal could provide a timestamp T
for some future time to a genuine card, which will generate a valid
authenticator for this future time. The malicious terminal can then
masquerade as the valid user at this future date.
• The system relies on valid user identifiers adhering to a particular for-
mat. However, this format is not specified in [3], and neither is any
indication given of the properties that this format should possess. We
now demonstrate the importance of this format, and indicate what rules
should be used to select such a format.
Suppose a malicious party E is able to observe two separate valid au-
thentications conducted by the same card, i.e. to observe two separate
messages sent to the authentication server. Suppose moreover that
these two authentication messages both use the same timestamp T —
this could be achieved by using a manipulated terminal, given that
we are assuming that the timestamp is generated externally to the
card. Suppose that the intercepted messages are (iA, C1, C2, T ) and
(iA, C
′
1, C
′
2, T ), where the messages are computed using random values
r and r′ respectively. Then we immediately have:
C1.(C
′
1)
−1 mod P = (iA)r.(iA)−r
′
mod P = (iA)
r−r′ mod P
and
C2.(C
′
2)
−1 mod P = (yA ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))r.(h(yA ⊕ T ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))).
(yA ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))−r′ .
(h(yA ⊕ T ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA)))−1 mod P
= (yA ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))r−r′ mod P
= (iA)
x(r−r′) mod P.
That is, E can immediately compute a pair of values ((iA)
w mod P ,
(iA)
wx mod P ), for some (unknown) value of w.
The interceptor E next computes a series of values ((iA)
w)j mod P for
a range of integers j, until a value is found, ((iA)
w)k mod P say, which
has the correct format for a user identifier. E now has the means to
conduct a successful authentication for a (non-existent) user B with
identifier iB = (iA)
wk mod P . This is achieved as follows.
E first computes zB = ((iA)
wx)k mod P = (iB)
x mod P . When E is
required to impersonate B at time T , E chooses a random value r,
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computes
C1 = (iB)
r mod P
and
C2 = (zB)
r.(h(zB ⊕ T )) mod P,
and sends the message (iB, C1, C2, T ). It is simple to verify that this
message will be accepted as genuine by the authentication server.
To avoid such an attack it is necessary to choose a format for identifiers
that contains sufficient redundancy so that it will be computationally
infeasible for an attacker to find a valid identifier by computing succes-
sive powers of a random integer.
Note that above analysis also serves to illustrate the fundamental idea
behind the system, namely that the value (iA)
x mod P is the smart
card’s critical secret value. Compromise of a pair of values (iA, (iA)
x mod
P ), where iA is a valid identifier, will enable unlimited masquerades as
an entity with identifier iA.
• As part of the motivation for the design of their scheme, Lin and Lai
[3] describe an attack on a previously proposed, and somewhat similar,
scheme due to Lee, Ryu and Yoo [2]. However, this attack assumes that
if iA is an identifier for the valid user A, then the identifier (iA)
t mod P
will be accepted as valid, where t is a random integer. However, it
is stated explicitly in [2] that, during the authentication procedure,
the authentication server will verify the correctness of the format of a
provided identifier. Although, as in [3], the format of an identifier is
not specified in [2], if the format is chosen with care (e.g. adhering to
the rule suggested above) then this attack will not work.
• The use of a fingerprint measurement sample alone to generate the
random number r appears to be an extremely dangerous procedure,
especially if the fingerprint reader is not built into the card. We start
by making this latter assumption.
Suppose that a malicious interceptor E is able to observe two different
(valid) authentication messages sent by the same card using the same
value of r, but with different values of the time stamp T . The fact
that the values of r are the same will be obvious to E since the values
of C1 will be the same. If, as we have assumed above, the fingerprint
reader is not integral to the card, arranging for two identical fingerprint
samples to be sent to a card should be relatively simple to achieve using
a manipulated terminal.
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Suppose these two messages are (iA, C1, C2, T ) and (iA, C1, C
′
2, T
′). E
now computes
C2.(C
′
2)
−1 mod P = (yA ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))r.(h(yA ⊕ T ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))).
(yA ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))−r.
(h(yA ⊕ T ′ ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA)))−1 mod P
= (h(yA ⊕ T ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))).
(h(yA ⊕ T ′ ⊕ h(pA ⊕ sA))) mod P.
Next suppose that E manages to steal the card used to generate these
two messages, and also that E has the means to input to the card a
correct fingerprint sample for user A. (Means by which this might be
possible are discussed above — in particular, if the fingerprint reader is
not integral to the card, then this would appear to be relatively simple
to achieve).
E can now conduct an exhaustive search for pA using the stolen card,
without sending any messages to the authentication server. To check
one guess for the password, p∗A say, E simply uses the card to generate
two authentication messages, both using the same value of r (read-
ily achieved using an external fingerprint reader) and p∗A, and where
the timestamps used are the same as for the two previously inter-
cepted messages. Suppose the resulting authentication messages are
(iA, C1, D2, T ) and (iA, C1, D
′
2, T
′). E now computes D2.(D′2)
−1 mod P
and compares it with the value C2.(C
′
2)
−1 mod P . If the guess for the
password is correct then these values will be equal; if not then the val-
ues will almost certainly be different. This thus forms the basis for an
exhaustive password search for a stolen card. If pA is poorly chosen, as
is usually the case for human-selected passwords, such an exhaustive
search should be feasible, at least for some cards.
Of course, if the fingerprint reader is built into the card, then arranging
for authentication messages to be generated using precisely the same
value of r will be considerably more difficult. However, as discussed
for example in [6, 7], with current card technology performing feature
extraction from a fingerprint sample on a card is not really feasible;
hence even if the fingerprint reader is integrated into the card, some of
the processing associated with matching the sample to a template will
need to be performed off the card. As a result, it may be possible for a
malicious terminal to manipulate the value of r even if the fingerprint
reader is built into the card. Finally we note that the authors of [3] do
not appear to have done any experiments to justify their assertion that
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using a fingerprint sample to generate r is a technique that generates
sufficient randomness to avoid the possibility of repeating values of r.
• The password change procedure is very hazardous, since the card does
not have a means to check the validity of the current password. That is,
the card password can be changed without entering the correct current
password. This could give rise to problems as follows.
– A user who follows the password change process and enters the
incorrect value for the current password, e.g. in error, will render
the card unusable.
– If a malicious third party has temporary access to a card, and can
somehow enter a correct biometric sample, then this party can
change the password and thereby render the card unusable, even
if this party does not know the correct password. A similar attack
could be achieved by a malicious terminal, when the card is being
used by the authorised user.
4 Concluding remarks
We have analysed a proposed remote user authentication scheme based on a
smart card and biometrics. We have shown that the system fails to meet its
objectives under reasonable assumptions about the threat model. In particu-
lar, if the biometric sensor (in this case a fingerprint reader) is not integrated
into the card then serious attacks appear to be relatively simple to conduct.
Finally we note that the paper [3] describing the system analysed here
does not contain a threat model. The absence of any such model may help to
explain why the attacks described in this paper are possible, in that design-
ing a system to be robust against feasible attacks does require a thorough
understanding of what attacks may be possible.
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